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Abstract—Cloud federation is an emergent cloud-computing
paradigm where partner organisations share data and services
hosted on their own cloud platforms.
In this context, it is crucial to enforce access control policies
that satisfy data protection and privacy requirements of partner
organisations. However, due to the distributed nature of cloud
federations, the access control system alone does not guarantee
that its deployed components cannot be circumvented while
processing access requests.
In order to promote accountability and reliability of a
distributed access control system, we present a decentralised
runtime monitoring architecture based on blockchain technology.
Index Terms—Access Control, Cloud Federation, Runtime
Monitoring, Blockchain, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION & MOTIVATION
The advent of cloud computing has enabled new collabora-
tive scenarios in which users and organisations share resources,
information and services in order to achieve a common busi-
ness goal or interest. An instance of this trend is provided by
federated clouds [1], [2], [3] which are created dynamically
to achieve such a business goal. However, its adoption can
be hindered by security concerns such as who can access the
shared resources, for what purposes, and what are the potential
consequences of granting access.
An approach typically adopted to address these concerns is
to deploy a federation-wise access control system to enforce
access control policies attached to the federation by the
resource owner [4]. This means that there will be distributed
components that receive, exchange and process access requests
and their corresponding access decisions with the possibility of
being compromised. Indeed, it is possible that the components
are compromised so that access requests or responses are
modiﬁed, or the policies and the evaluation process are altered
by a malicious user or software to gain unauthorised access
to federated resources.
To detect such attacks, this paper proposes a runtime
monitoring architecture for distributed access control systems:
Decentralised Runtime Access Monitoring System (DRAMS).
This is achieved by including distributed logging probes which
sense access control activities and intercept access requests
and decisions. These logs are then processed to check the
integrity of the monitored components. A key feature of
DRAMS is that not only it is able to detect attacks to the
components involved in an access control decision, but it
is also resilient to attacks targeting the integrity of the logs
or of the monitoring components. To achieve this, DRAMS
leverages blockchain technologies [5] as an infrastructure
for storing logs and performing non-repudiable monitoring
checks. Blockchain is a novel technology that, besides its
application to cryptocurrency, features fascinating properties
of data integrity, distribution and control along with the
support for so-called smart-contracts, which are arbitrarily
complex programs deployed and executed autonomously on
a blockchain.
DRAMS is proposed upon the access control system of
Federation-as-a-Service (FaaS) [3], a recently proposed ap-
proach to cloud federation devised and developed by the
H2020 project SUNFISH [6]. The FaaS access control system
is based on the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [7] consisting of Policy Decision Point (PDP) and
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). Indeed, once a PEP receives
a user’s request, it forwards it to the PDP, which calculates
the access decision. The decision is then enforced by the PEP.
In FaaS, the XACML components are deployed along with
the tenants (i.e., virtual spaces of computing resources belong-
ing to different clouds) underlying a FaaS federation. The PDP
and the policy management is placed in the infrastructural
tenant (i.e., the tenant owned by all federation clouds that
enable the FaaS functionalities). PEPs are instead deployed
in a distributed manner on the tenants edge, thus to intercept
all communications, interact with the distributed sources of
information and enforce the calculated accesses.
In what follows, we present DRAMS architecture and
discuss the main challenges in implementing such architecture
on top of blockchain technology.
II. DRAMS ARCHITECTURE
DRAMS rests on a smart-contract blockchain to store
logs and perform monitoring checks on them. Additionally,
DRAMS is equipped with a formally-grounded policy analyser
that evaluates whether an access decision is correct according
to the semantics of the available policies. Its architecture is
illustrated in Figure 1 which has the following components:
• Logger: consisting of Probing agents for intercepting
and forwarding data to create access logs and Logging
Interface (LI), which exposes to agents endpoints for
storing data and managing security alert events generated
by smart-contracts.
• Smart-contract blockchain: it is the smart-contract
blockchain system storing and comparing logs, using
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Figure 1: DRAMS architecture deployed on the access control system of a FaaS cloud federation (where ’Section i’ stands for
a set of computing resources belonging to a cloud ‘i’, while LI stands for Logging Interface)
expressly devised algorithms, thus to mitigate threat that
modiﬁes access control decisions or responses.
• Analyser: it checks the correctness of the access decisions
calculated for the intercepted requests, with respect to the
policies currently in force in the system to mitigate threats
that alter the policy enforced or the policy evaluation
process.
Indeed, the key element of the system is the blockchain
infrastructure: it is connected via the LI, placed in each tenant,
to all the other components. The agents are distributed in each
tenant where the monitored access control components (i.e.,
PDP and PEP) are placed.
The LI also provides symmetric encryption and decryption
functions, which are exploited by the other components to
store/retrieve encrypted data in/from smart-contracts. Indeed,
as data stored on a blockchain are visible to all users, encryp-
tion is used to protect data conﬁdentiality.
The Analyser is a standalone entity logically placed within
the Infrastructural Tenant, but deployed within a different
cloud section with respect to the access control components.
It dynamically consumes and evaluates the gathered logs to
ensure the correct enforcement of access decisions. On the
base of a logical representation of the access control policies
evaluated by the PDP, the Analyser checks if for a given
request the calculated response is the expected one using the
formally-grounded analysis framework for XACML presented
in [8].
III. DISCUSSION
We discuss here the main challenges in implementing the
DRAMS architecture.
System Integrity. Even though the smart-contract of DRAMS
is immutable, the integrity of the other components, e.g. the
LI, cannot be guaranteed by-design, because they are deployed
off-chain. Similarly, as all the LI instances share a symmetric
key K, its management is of paramount importance.
To mitigate both difﬁculties, we can introduce a trusted
hardware platform (e.g., Trusted Platform Module) within the
system. On the one hand, it can be leveraged to store the
symmetric keys by increasing the overall system security. On
the other hand, this platform can be utilised to guarantee the
integrity of the off-chain components.
Log Size. The key parameter highly affecting the monitoring
system is the size of the log. In fact, the bigger the size is, the
higher is the latency to store the log on the blockchain. By re-
lying on a private blockchain, where all PoW (Proof-of-Work)
parameters can be dynamically tuned according to the needs,
the latency can be maintained under control. However, due
to the limited size of the network and a possibly lightweight
PoW, this solution does not ensure strong integrity guarantees.
Alternatively, a hybrid approach combining classical database
with blockchain system should offer an adequate ﬂexibility
to ﬁnd a trade-off between latency, integrity guarantees and,
in case of public chain, cost. A preliminary design to such a
system is presented in [9].
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